Social science: city centre or leafy suburb by Dupré, John
	   1	  
Social Science: City Centre or Leafy Suburb1 
 
John Dupré 
Egenis, University of Exeter 
 
Abstract 
This article argues, in opposition to a common interpretation of Wittgenstein 
deriving from Winch, that there is nothing especially problematic about the 
social sciences.  Familiar Wittgensteinian theses about language, notably on 
the open-endedness of linguistic rules and on the importance of family 
resemblance concepts, do have great relevance to the social sciences, but 
also to much of the natural sciences.  The differences between scientific and 
ordinary language are much less sharp than Winch, and probably 
Wittgenstein, supposed.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I am honoured to have been invited to speak at the annual conference of the 
British Wittgenstein Conference, for which the first version of this paper was 
prepared, and I would like to thank the organisers, Nigel Pleasants and 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, for the invitation. I cannot claim to be a Wittgenstein 
scholar.  However, having started my philosophical life as an undergraduate 
at St John’s College Oxford, under the tutelage of Peter Hacker and the late 
Gordon Baker, all my early training was coloured with Wittgenstein’s thought. I 
have no doubt that Wittgenstein, or at least an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy, has shaped much of the work I have done in the philosophy 
of science.  
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1. Introduction 
 
My title, as will not have escaped readers of Wittgenstein, alludes to a 
memorable figure from the Philosophical Investigations.  Let me begin by 
quoting this in full: 
...ask yourself whether [our language] was [complete] before the 
symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus 
were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our 
language…Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of 
little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with 
additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of 
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §18) 
 
This charming metaphor suggests some kind of radical disjunction between 
so-called “ordinary language” and the language of science, and while such a 
disjunction may seem plausible enough when science is represented by these 
particular examples, in general it is, I think, a serious mistake.   
 
I believe it is also a dangerous mistake, and the main burden of this paper will 
be to argue that it is a mistake that can lead to serious misunderstanding of 
	   3	  
the nature of the social sciences.  The kinds of examples Wittgenstein cites 
here, chemical notation and mathematics, fit easily with a certain view of 
scientific method. Here is Wittgenstein in the Blue Book: 
 
Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation 
with the method of science.  I mean the method of reducing the 
explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of 
primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of 
different topics by using a generalization.  Philosophers constantly see 
the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to 
ask and answer questions in the way that science does.  This tendency 
is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.  (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 18) 
 
I am in complete agreement with the general tendency of these remarks.  But 
I have one major disagreement.  What Wittgenstein describes is not the 
method of science.  It may or may not be the method of physics, but it is 
certainly not the method of biology, the science I know best, and it certainly 
should not be the aspiration of social science.  What these benighted 
philosophers do, in fact, is worse than what Wittgenstein suggests: they 
attempt to do philosophy in the way that they falsely imagine that science is 
done.  Darkness is unsurprising. 
 
I must now crave the reader’s indulgence for some digression on a science 
that surely belongs among the natural sciences, biology.  My point will be to 
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give a little more substantial sense of how this area of science differs from 
that suggested by the passage just cited from the Blue Book. Biology, I want 
to suggest, is actually a maze of little streets and squares just as intricate as 
ordinary language.  No doubt there are differences, as there might be, for 
instance, between Cambridge and Vienna.  But there are few regular streets 
or uniform houses.  A fortiori, there are unlikely to be any such orderly 
suburbs in the social sciences.   
 
Having offered in brief outline some reasons for preferring a very different 
vision of biology, I shall return to the social sciences and suggest that there is 
nothing so exceptional or anomalous about the scientific study of society.  
Finally, I shall return to the question of the relation between the languages of 
science and everyday life.  I shall argue that these are not so different as most 
philosophers, including many who have grounded their views in their reading 
of Wittgenstein, have supposed.  Indeed, the lessons that we have learned 
from Wittgenstein are deeply relevant to the languages of science, both 
natural and social.  Or so I shall argue.  
 
2. Biology 
 
Back in the 1970s, when logical empiricism was still alive, if in decline, there 
were quixotic attempts to formalise the theory of evolution (e.g. Williams 
1970).  These attempts were not successful, however.  And in hindsight it is 
easy enough to see many reasons why success was not to be expected.  One 
such reason should be no surprise to this audience.  The formalisation project 
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assumes that central general terms will have exact definitions, necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their application.  But language doesn’t generally work 
like this.  Wittgenstein has taught us to look at the uses of words, and when 
we do this we do not find any such simple and unambiguous rules for their 
uses.  Nonetheless, many philosophers, and perhaps even Wittgenstein 
himself, have supposed that science was different.  This is one natural way of 
understanding the urban planning metaphor I cited earlier. 
 
My personal pathway into Wittgensteinian philosophy of biology began with 
reflections on our general terms for kinds of organisms.  When I started doing 
philosophy in the 1970s, the hottest topic was the so-called new theory of 
reference, centred on Saul Kripke’s ideas about direct reference, unmediated 
by anything like a Fregean sense.  Although these ideas were generally 
associated with the reference of proper names, Hilary Putnam, and to some 
extent Kripke himself, proposed extending something similar to general terms, 
proposing their direct reference to natural kinds. 
 
Putnam wrote, for example, that “the predominant sense of ‘lemon’ is one in 
which to be a lemon something has to have the genetic code of a lemon” 
(1975, p. 240).  I should stress that Putnam is very careful not to say that this 
criterion provides a definition of lemon.  Our use of the word continues to be 
guided by loose pre-scientific criteria—lemons are yellow, sour, etc.  But 
these everyday criteria do not determine the reference of the word. The idea 
is that science discovers the essences of the kinds that our ordinary language 
more or less successfully gropes for.  Part of the use of our ordinary word 
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“lemon” is to refer, somehow or other, to the real kinds with real essences 
described by science. 
 
There are two reasons why this cannot be right.  First, much of our ordinary 
language isn’t even close enough to a candidate “scientific” term to aim for a 
scientific reference.  As I have argued before in some detail, many ordinary 
language terms serve important and identifiable purposes, but purposes far 
removed from those of professional taxonomists (Dupré 1981).  We are 
interested in organisms that can be eaten, can be used to build houses or 
make clothes, and so on, and the extensions of terms in our languages can 
be traced to their utility for serving these functions.     
 
But second, and even more importantly, science doesn’t provide the kinds of 
unique and essential definitions that Putnam’s story assumes.  Examples of 
this second point are legion once one starts to look for them.  Indeed, the 
scientific use of the term “species” perfectly illustrates the point2.  But here I 
shall turn to an even more iconic term in contemporary biology, one also 
implicated in Putnam’s example of the lemon, the gene. When we look at the 
actual use of this word in science we find neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions of application, nor even a serious aspiration to decide on such. 
 
The term “gene” was invented by the Danish botanist Wilhelm Johanssen in 
1909.  The entity to which it referred is often taken to have been discovered 
by the Moravian monk, Gregor Mendel in the 1860s, whose work was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Dupré (1981; 1999); Ereshefsky (1992). 
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famously ignored until the beginning of the 20th century.  It became 
established at the heart of biology through the work of Thomas Hunt Morgan 
and his collaborators, at Columbia and Cal Tech in the USA, on the fruit fly 
Drosophila Melanogaster.   This hyper-Whiggishly summarises a set of stories 
to which many historians have devoted their lives3. 
 
The phenomenon the discovery of which was attributed to Mendel is 
particulate inheritance.  Mendel recorded particular variable features of plants 
in parents and their offspring across multiple generations, and found results 
consistent with the hypothesis that organisms received factors from each 
parent capable of determining the presence of these features.  In case the 
organisms received factors determining different features, one or other was 
found to be “dominant”, sufficient, that is to say, to override the influence of its 
rival.  These factors were, more or less, what Johannsen almost half a century 
later would call genes, and which were studied in the quite different context of 
fruit flies by Morgan. 
 
Mendelian genetics continues to this day, especially in agricultural breeding 
programmes and in medicine. But it has been largely superseded by a quite 
different programme of genetics, which originated from Francis Crick, James 
Watson and others’ iconic exposition of the structure of DNA, the material that 
mediates central aspects of biological inheritance.  Crick and Watson’s 
breakthrough was soon followed by the unravelling of a pathway by which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For an excellent more detailed account of this history, see Rheinberger et al. 
(2015). 
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DNA could act on the development and functioning of the organism, by 
providing the template for the production of protein molecules which, in turn, 
were understood as being the basic functional molecules that underlay the 
structure and behaviour of the organism.  The word “gene” then came to be 
understood as referring to a portion of DNA sequence that provided the 
information, or “coded”, for a protein. 
 
As philosophers soon noted, this molecular concept of the gene was quite 
distinct from, and even incommensurable with, the Mendelian concept4.  For a 
start, the Mendelian gene had no application at all except to variable features 
of the organism: it explained differences.  There are no human Mendelian 
genes for having a head, as everyone has one.  But there are lots of proteins 
in a head.  In short, a Mendelian gene is, from a molecular point of view, a 
variation in the DNA sequence, whereas a molecular gene is a (sufficiently) 
stable chunk of the sequence, of a particular kind. 
 
But this is far from the end of the story.  It soon turned out that only a very 
small percentage of the genome consisted of protein-coding sequence.  At 
first this led to the suggestion that the remainder was “junk”, useless remains 
of past evolutionary processes.  But subsequently much of this junk has found 
a use, in various levels of regulation of the cell, including the expression of 
protein-coding genes.  Moreover, much of this “junk” turns out to be buried 
within what were once taken to be protein-coding genes.  The latter, it 
emerged, consisted of alternating segments of coding and non-coding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A classic exposition of this point can be found in Hull (1974). 
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sequence, exons and introns.  This fragmentation of coding genes made 
possible the construction of many different proteins—sometimes thousands—
by rearrangement or deletion of some of the sections.  And within the non-
coding sections could often be found distinct functional elements.  Which of 
these are genes?  How much of the discontinuously coding gene is the same 
gene?  And so on.  “Gene”, it is now often concluded, refers to any bit of 
sequence to which a competent geneticist has reason to refer. 
 
With all these advances in molecular genetics, Mendelian genetics has not 
been abandoned.  It still remains a central concern, for example, for plant 
breeders and medical epidemiologists.  But note, finally, that a Mendelian 
gene need not refer to any specific sequence.  Typically a Mendelian gene is 
a defect in the genome that prevents the proper development of a trait in the 
organism.  But many different sequence errors can cause the same defect.  
Some 1500 different sequence anomalies, for instance, have been found that 
lead to cystic fibrosis, a disease caused by the failure to produce a particular 
functional protein.  
 
In summary, then, the language of biological science does not lead us to an 
orderly array of systematically related references.  It is not that scientific terms 
do not refer.  But the uses to which they are put dictate a motely crew of 
references: structurally diverse, overlapping and cross-cutting, and so on.  In 
part this merely reflects the complexity and diversity of the phenomena to 
which this language has been designed to refer. Returning to our framing 
metaphor, we have, indeed, not only a maze of little streets and squares in 
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our language but also, underlying this language like the remains of an even 
more ancient city, the little streets and squares of biological reality. 
 
It is hard not to be reminded of Wittgenstein’s discussions on rule-following.  
The rules for applying the word “gene” are constantly evolving and as 
important new phenomena come to light decisions must be made, explicitly or 
more likely implicitly, as to whether and how the word is to be extended in the 
light of these phenomena.  Science is not the discovery of esoteric objects 
and their crystalline essences, determining their reference in any imaginable 
context.  In biology, at least, it is rather the construction of various 
perspectives on an immensely complex domain of ever-changing and deeply 
intertwined processes5.  
 
3. Social Science 
 
I won’t apologise for spending so much time on biology, because the 
understanding of social science is so often derailed by a false contrast with a 
quite misguided image of the so-called natural sciences.  In fact, as I now 
want to argue, the complexity and diversity of both language and phenomena 
provide no more objection in principle to a successful social science than they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This sentence summarizes a great deal.  For detailed defence of the need 
for multiple perspectives on biological phenomena, see Dupré (1993); for the 
case that these phenomena must be understood as intertwined processes 
(rather than distinct things, or substances) see Dupré (2012). 
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do to biological science.  We need only avoid unrealistic and unattainable 
aspirations as to what any science can be expected to achieve.   
 
What might be different about social science?  Obviously there is a different 
subject matter.  Winch’s (1958) classic critique of social science takes science 
to be a matter of little more than inductive generalisation and reasonably 
enough claims, for various reasons, that this will not take us very far in 
studying society.  Not very far; but not nowhere either.  Economists, though 
their more ambitious theories are often subject to well-deserved criticism, can 
at least provide empirical information about the relationship between, for 
example, government expenditure and employment, which are sometimes 
fairly successfully projectable into the future.  The limits of such science may 
be due to many things.  It is plausible that other variables will be relevant, and 
including further variables will produce more successful models.  Perhaps 
some of these variables are unknown, or are difficult to measure.  Very 
importantly, the phenomena may be substantially stochastic, and in principle 
not very predictable.  This might be due in part to the impact of unpredictable 
events—meteorological, political, etc.  Everything I have just said could be 
said equally, mutatis mutandis, of a science such as population ecology, 
which aims to track the numbers in populations of interacting organisms.  
There are many variables the nature and importance of which is not fully 
known, many unpredictable shocks, and so on.  As one other example from 
social science, the rather robust evidence that happiness in a society is an 
inverse function of socio-economic inequality is an empirical correlation that 
could well be given a lot more attention.  
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I think that a lot of variably useful social science is like this; indeed this is 
probably where Millian science has lasted best. But it does also have 
important and well-known limits.  Most obviously it gives us no understanding.  
Why do many people feel unhappy in very unequal societies.  Envy? A sense 
of worthlessness by comparison to the more fortunate?  Perhaps people are 
happiest when they feel a wide social solidarity (“we are all in it together” as 
David Cameron has surprisingly pointed out).  Supposing we answer these 
questions there is another set of questions about why humans are, or come to 
be, such that they exhibit these responses.  But parallel questions can, of 
course be raised in similar natural sciences, and can sometimes be 
answered.  The question before us is whether there is anything peculiar to the 
social sciences that makes a parallel scientific pursuit of the relevant 
questions impossible. And one problem that immediately arises is that it is 
most doubtful whether there is anything very general to be said about how 
sciences provide the relevant kinds of deeper understanding. 
 
On answer does suggest itself as a quite general way in which deeper 
understanding of social facts, scientific or otherwise, should be provided.  
Wittgenstein emphasised the centrality of rules in the structure of social life, 
and thus the idea that there is something normative about the social. This is 
an idea that plays a central part in Winch’s arguments against a social 
science following the methods of the natural sciences.  It also raises a hugely 
complex debate that has carried on at least since Davidson’s famous, or 
notorious, claim that reasons are just causes.  One reason for rejecting this 
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proposal is that reasons are, unquestionably, normative.  If I have a 
compelling reason for doing something, then ceteris paribus I ought to do it.  
And surely there is nothing normative about causality.  I don’t propose to 
address this issue head on.  What I do want to suggest is that both 
Davidsonians on the one hand, and Wittgensteinans (and others) who 
strongly reject this assimilation on the other, often carry out their arguments 
as if the question what a cause is were a relatively straightforward one.  It is 
not. 
 
Philosophers who debate the nature of causation offer a range of views.  
There are still many defenders of the Humean view that causation is 
ultimately no more than correlation; others are attempting to reintroduce neo-
Aristotelian conceptions of causal power, and their ilk; others again prefer to 
treat causation in a more agent-centred view as grounded in the idea of 
intervention; and so on.  My own view, which strikes me as a natural one for a 
philosopher strongly influenced by Wittgenstein, is pluralistic.  All of these 
analyses have their roles in our use of causal talk; none of them suffices to 
provide an analysis of causation in general.  The universe manages very well 
without any uniform kind of cement.   
 
One helpful way of thinking about causal talk generally is as the external 
analogue of explanation.  Causal relations are the facts, or some of the facts, 
that make our explanations true, or useful.  But it is fairly obvious that there is 
no one kind of explanation. Scepticism about social science was 
understandable when scientific explanation was widely understood in terms of 
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the deductive-nomological model, and its correlate in the world was taken to 
be either Humean universal correlations, or perhaps more modally robust 
laws of nature.  But these ideas are well past their sell-by dates.  In the 
biology that I study no one is much interested in universal correlations still 
less laws of nature.  Regularity is local, specific, and—a point I would be 
happy to elaborate on at length in another context—always maintained with a 
great deal of effort.   
 
Given this perspective on the nature of causes, the question whether reasons 
are a kind of cause seems much less portentous.  That people have reasons 
of various sorts is uncontroversially a kind of fact that is essential to our 
explanation of what they do.  Is it, though, a kind of fact that includes some 
kind of barrier to elaboration into the kind of explanation that should be called 
scientific?  
 
Is there, then, anything in principle unscientific about the delineation of the 
rules that exist in a particular society?  I cannot see why.  Language is 
profoundly normative, but this doesn’t make the science of linguistics 
impossible.  It is a fact, in English, that plural nouns take plural verb forms.  If I 
want to inform you that cows are herbivorous, I ought to say “cows are 
herbivorous” and I ought not to say “cows is herbivorous”.  And that’s a fact.  
Not a very high-level fact, or a very important one, no doubt.  As more 
descriptive linguists have insisted, correctly in my view, there may well be 
dialects in which “cows is herbivorous” is correct, and it may come to pass 
that “cows is herbivorous” becomes generally correct English.  But not yet.  
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Are these scientific facts?  I really don’t understand this question.  As Austin 
might have said, the word that wears the trousers is “unscientific”.  There are 
lots of ways of being unscientific.  “Unscientific” is a term of criticism.  Being 
unscientific is liable to lead one to conclusions that are likely to be false.  And 
the sentence “In English one should not say ‘cows is herbivorous’” is true.  
Might one rather say that this is non-scientific?  The only sense I can make of 
this is that the statement in question is not one that should or could play any 
part in a science of linguistics. And I simply have no idea what basis there 
might be for such a claim. 
 
I suppose someone might worry that normative linguistics is a science the 
claims of which are made true by us rather than by nature (as if, somehow we 
were not part of nature).  But surely this is too quick and stipulative to serve 
as an argument against the legitimacy of linguistics or, for example, social 
anthropology as sciences.  Another related worry that might possibly serve as 
an objection to the scientific status of such disciplines is that, as I briefly 
mentioned a moment ago, linguistic generalisations are highly mutable.  Such 
fine words as vape, normcore, and slacktivism, didn’t exist ten years ago, but 
are now enshrined in the Oxford dictionary.  Language is a dynamic entity and 
truths about it change over time. But if the impermanence of social scientific 
truths makes them ineligible for science, then we shall also have to dispose of 
biology.  Evolution assures us that the biological entities that exist today are 
very different from those that existed in the distant past.  And this is true at all 
levels, from biological molecules such as proteins and nucleotides, to 
ecological systems.  
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My argument so far is that there is nothing in the rule-governed nature of 
social facts that presents any particular obstacle to their scientific 
investigation.  To take the argument a little further I need a quick exegetical 
interpolation.  Wittgenstein’s implications for the social sciences have very 
largely been channelled through the well-known account of Peter Winch.  
According to Nigel Pleasants, in his book Wittgenstein and the Idea of a 
Critical Social Theory (1999), Winch was very substantially mistaken in his 
interpretation of Wittgenstein.  Indeed, according to Pleasants, Winch offers 
us a Kantian account of social reality of exactly the kind Wittgenstein 
inveighed against.  If this is right, I shall now be considering the ideas of 
Winch rather than Wittgenstein.  (We might perhaps call him Winchenstein, a 
fitting colleague for the even better-known student of Wittgenstein’s rules, 
Kripkenstein.)   
 
Winch, at any rate, argued that a crucial difference between the social and the 
natural sciences is that in the former rules come in twice.  The natural 
scientist must learn the rules that concern the practice of her science.  She 
must learn, for example, when it is appropriate to say, “there is an electron” or 
“that is a kinase”.  More generally, scientists need to know when two 
situations are to be counted as belonging to the same kinds.  But, according 
to Winch, the social scientist must also have some kind of knowledge of the 
rules that govern the practice she is investigating.  Thus he writes: 
If the judgments of identity—and hence the generalisations—of the 
sociologist of religion rest on criteria taken from religion, then his 
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relation to religion cannot be just that of the observer to the observed.  
It must rather be analogous to the participation of the natural scientist 
with his fellow workers in the activities of scientific investigation.  …  [A] 
historian or sociologist of religion must have some religious feeling if he 
is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying. 
The sociologist of religion, it appears, will face the difficult task of engaging 
simultaneously in two rule-governed social worlds, the world of sociology and 
the world of religion. 
 
I have to confess I find this strange.  Of course if the sociologist is 
investigating a system of rules then he is engaged with two systems of rules: 
the rules of sociological discourse and the rules he is investigating.  But why 
must he participate in the latter?  I mean no disrespect to the tradition of 
cultural anthropology that does pursue a certain kind of participation with the 
societies it aims to investigate, and there may be a particular kind of 
knowledge that requires this kind of methodology.  But surely it is not the only 
kind of knowledge possible of an unfamiliar culture?  As an atheist I can 
perfectly well understand why everyone in a village goes into a large building 
on Sunday morning and recites various narratives together about what I take 
to be an imaginary being.  I might sympathise less with this practice than 
could a religious person, but I can understand it fairly well.  And even if 
participatory anthropology gains a certain depth of understanding that is not 
available to other methods of study, it surely pays a price for this in breadth, 
or generality? 
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A more plausible point here is a relatively familiar holistic thought about 
interpretation.  If I explain the villagers’ church attendance by noting that they 
believe that omitting to go to church on Sunday’s is a mortal sin, I won’t 
understand this unless I find out what sin is, the special gravity and 
implications of mortal sin, and perhaps many further beliefs about grace, the 
love of God, and so on.  I mention this rather familiar point in part to reiterate 
the central thesis of this talk, that social science is not that different from much 
in the natural sciences.  In biology, at least, a similar kind of holism applies 
equally.  In both cases it can provide severe obstacles to understanding, but 
only in the sense that the task is harder than might naively have been 
supposed, not that it is impossible. 
 
Consider, for instance, molecular biology.  Some people once thought, 
perhaps, that one could examine a part of a molecule and discern that it was 
a gene for blue eyes, or homosexuality, or whatever, meaning that somehow 
encoded in the molecule was its tendency to bring about this trait in the 
organism of which it was part.  Many journalists still seem to believe this.  
Now, however, no serious biologist thinks anything of the sort, if any ever did.  
A more sophisticated view is that a gene is a part of a molecule the function of 
which is to generate the production of a particular protein.  But now it is 
understood that the pathway from gene to protein involves multiple steps: 
excision of parts of the sequence and their resplicing into a variety of new 
sequences; subsequent editing and packaging; folding into more or less 
specific structures, many of which collapse onto specific structures only in 
reaction with particular interactive partners, or substrates.  A protein, in turn, 
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will often be capable of many different functions depending on its chemical 
context. The same molecule in a different kind of cell may serve a quite 
different set of functions.  In sum, there is no reason to suppose there is any 
limited set of possible functions for a molecule, and to understand its 
biological significance it is essential to know a lot about the context to which it 
is related. 
 
I am not, of course, suggesting that molecules obey rules, or have meanings.  
I am just noting that the holism, the necessity of knowing a lot about the 
context in which an object acts in order to understand its significance and 
functions, is characteristic of the natural, or at least the biological, sciences as 
much as of the social sciences.   
 
A more promising interpretation of the implications of these two levels of 
involvement of meaning can also be found in Winch.  If social science is to be 
of any use to us, then whatever specialised technical language the expert 
may elect to use, this must eventually be translated back into the ordinary 
language we can all understand.  We want to find out about our social world, 
and we understand that world in ordinary language.  If we want to understand 
the workings of the cell or the behaviour of black holes, on the other hand, we 
expect to have to learn something of the language of the relevant science.  
The importance of the stronger requirement on social language is frequently 
seen in the misunderstandings perpetuated especially by politicians through 
the language of economics.  It is easy for the naïve consumer of this 
discourse to suppose that a decline in inflation will mean that the prices they 
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pay will rise more slowly; but the technical term from economics has no such 
implication.  Perhaps more importantly, it is seldom remarked that there is no 
objectively correct measure of inflation, and any particular measure selected 
will have a different degree of accordance with the experience of an individual 
with a particular pattern of expenditure.  I suppose it could be argued that 
“inflation” has become a term of ordinary language; but if so it is a term no 
very precise meaning of which is widely understood.  
 
This observation leads to another important characteristic of the social 
sciences, a rather different way in which the normative is unavoidably 
implicated in their practice, that it makes little sense to consider them to be 
value-free.  The language that we use to describe society is often a “thick” 
language, a language in which central terms have both descriptive and 
evaluative content.  Failure to recognise this point is striking when, for 
example, evolutionary psychologists offer us allegedly value-free theories of 
the origins of aggression or rape.  If there is a value neutral concept of rape 
that can be applied to the study of animals, then it is not our ordinary 
language concept.  Here is a more insidious implication of the necessity of 
translating the findings of social science into the language we use and 
understand.  When we are told that ducks or flies commit acts of rape, and 
are encouraged to infer that this may well be in some sense a natural, evolved 
behaviour for humans, we are equivocating between a supposedly neutral 
observational sense of the term and our everyday normative sense.   
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How deep a divide does this show between the natural and the social 
sciences?  I suggest that it shows a deep and familiar difference between the 
subject matters, but no obvious systematic difference between the 
epistemological standards that constitute these diverse investigations as 
scientific.  If, as I suppose, our language for describing society and social 
institutions is profoundly impregnated with normative features, then it is 
unavoidable that we express its findings in this value-impregnated language.  
No such normative dimension applies to words such as “quark”, “quasar”, 
“enzyme”, or “clade”.  Why?  Because in general we don’t care about these 
things.  Some people, no doubt, have deep epistemic concerns with such 
esoteric entities, but it is no surprise that science involves epistemic values.   
 
4. Social sciences as life sciences 
 
Let me return to Wittgenstein.  Wittgenstein has given us a picture of 
language nicely envisioned as “a maze of little streets and squares, of old and 
new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods”.  Our 
language is diverse, with countless different words serving countless different 
functions.  These functions, moreover, are more or less open-ended.  As we 
confront unfamiliar situations we constantly make decisions as to how to 
extend the use of a word, a thesis famously exhibited in many parts of 
Wittgenstein’s work, notoriously, perhaps, in the rule-following considerations.  
If one sees the houses in Wittgenstein’s allegorical city as words, then we 
might imagine their development over time, as a roof extension is added to 
make room for the children, the kitchen or bathroom is remodelled, an interior 
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wall moved her or there to meet changing needs for space.  Language is not a 
fixed thing, but a process, responding adaptively to an ever-changing context. 
 
It is striking that what I have just said about language echoes perfectly much 
of what we have come to understand about life, as well.  Living systems are 
also dynamic, open-ended processes, which respond adaptively to a 
changing environment.  This is most familiar for evolutionary processes, but it 
is increasingly well understood that just the same is true of developmental 
processes.  Organisms do not follow mechanistic, deterministic pathways 
from zygote to death.  Development depends on an intricate blend of 
influences both from the chemistry and geometry of the developing organism 
and from the environment in which it develops.  This enables development to 
respond adaptively, or functionally, to its developmental environment. Such 
developmental plasticity can be discerned at all levels in living systems, down 
to the biochemical (West-Eberhard 2003).  Here it will be more relevant to 
focus on plasticity at a grosser level. 
 
There are many strategies for this developmental flexibility.  Many plants 
show remarkable morphological plasticity, diverting their energy into stems, 
roots, leaves, flowers, and so on in response to multiple contingencies of the 
environment they encounter.  Animals, though they also exhibit morphological 
plasticity, have tended rather to channel much of their adaptive plasticity into 
behaviour.  As they develop animals will acquire a range of behavioural 
capacities, and the set of such capacities will depend to some extent on their 
environment.  These may take the form of highly predictable responses to 
	   23	  
stimuli, or capacities that can be exercised as a result of some more open 
decision-making process.  It is hardly controversial that humans have taken 
both the diversity of potential capacities, and the complexity of decision-
making processes to an extent unmatched in the animal kingdom.  The 
diversity of capacities, in particular, is what makes possible the complexity of 
human societies, grounded in an intricate division of labour. 
 
The point of these fairly banal observations is to emphasise the continuity not 
only of the general approach of the social sciences with the biological 
sciences (and a fortiori the natural sciences), but also their subject matter.  
Equally I would stress the similarities between the methods of the social and 
natural sciences.  This is not to say that they are very similar, still less to 
claim, whatever this means, that we are just animals, and there are no special 
problems for the social sciences.  On the contrary, as I have argued for many 
years, the sciences are extremely diverse.  There are many similarities and 
differences.  Structural molecular biology is very different from taxonomy, and 
both are very different from high energy physics. Population ecology uses 
methods much more similar to economics than to astronomy or physiology.  
And so on.  It is not that they are very similar, but that there is no obvious 
chasm between the natural and social sciences. We extend our concept of 
science, to adapt a useful analogy, “as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on 
fibre” (Wittgenstein 1953, §67).   
 
I have said that the findings of the social sciences must, to be useful, be 
expressible in the ordinary language that we all understand.  Why is this not 
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the basis of a conceptual divide between the natural and social sciences?  
The answer is a point perhaps more important than the multiple family 
resemblances between the sciences.  The language of science is not so 
different from any other part of language.  Perhaps excessive attention to the 
peculiarities of mathematics has obscured this point, and given the impression 
that the language of science is uniquely precise.  In fact both scientific and 
non-scientific words have both precise and not so precise meanings.  In 
ordinary language, alongside such a paradigmatic family resemblance 
concept as “tool” we have perfectly exact terms such as “oil filter wrench” or 
“picture frame clamp”.  Science has very precise terms too, of course, but the 
most important terms are far from exact.  As I explained earlier, such terms as 
“species” and “gene” are far from exact terms, while terms for particular genes 
or species such as  “sonic hedgehog” or “Lesser Spotted Dogfish” may be 
quite precise.  Currently biologists debate whether bacteria or viruses form 
species, or whether promoters are genes.  These are not so much debates 
about the nature of phenomena as about how to extend the use of a highly 
flexible term.  Hans-Joerg Rheinberger (1997) has persuasively argued that 
this flexibility is vital for the progress of science.  At any rate, we should recall 
Wittgenstein’s reminder that “inexact” does not mean “unusable” (Wittgenstein 
1953, §88).    
 
My conclusion, then, is that Wittgenstein’s profound insights about language 
apply very much the same way to the language of science as to the more 
mundane parts of our linguistic equipment.  Science, social or otherwise, 
should be as much a part of the remit of his philosophical insights into the 
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workings of language as any other part of human life.  Most of science should 
also be seen as “a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, 
and of houses with additions from various periods”.  If there are “new 
boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses”, there are surely 
not a multitude of these.  Wittgenstein picks as examples of the latter 
chemical symbolism and calculus, which are certainly reasonable 
candidates—though anyone attempting to understand the complexities of 
protein chemistry, so-called intrinsically disordered proteins, for example, 
which exist in a suite of different conformations among which they rapidly 
pass until temporarily stabilised by interaction with a suitable substrate, might 
doubt how far the architectural regularity extended into the chemical suburb.   
 
 More general conceptions of science should stress rather a set of epistemic 
virtues, such as sensitivity to empirical fact, openness to critical engagement 
from diverse sources, coherence with other well-established beliefs, perhaps 
aesthetic virtues such as elegance and simplicity, and so on.  It is the 
absence or violation of such virtues that licenses application of the trouser 
word, “unscientific”. The diversity of such values, moreover, makes science an 
obvious candidate for interpretation in the light of the idea of family 
resemblance: not all sciences possess all such virtues, or to the same degree, 
and this is entirely appropriate in view of the diversity of subject matter.  In 
addition to the diversity of subject matter, recent philosophy of science has 
stressed the importance of multiple perspectives on the same subject matter, 
another space for divergent methods and virtues.  One reason it is important 
to highlight this diversity of scientific methods and practices is that attempts to 
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ape the imagined systematic methods of the natural sciences has led the 
social sciences down many blind alleys.  There are no such systematic 
methods, just various more or less successful methods for investigating a 
huge range of phenomena; social science should be free to develop its own.  
Perhaps it has so far been less successful than many of the natural sciences; 
but if so it is because it is harder, or perhaps it has been less well-done, not 
because it has failed to recognise some mythical scientific method. 
 
I don’t know whether Wittgenstein had a confused view of science of the kind I 
have gestured towards.  He seems to have said very little about social 
science.  If he had such a view, it is very understandable given the views of 
the time, dominated by the model of physics and, in philosophy, by the 
ambitions of logical positivism and logical empiricism.  Now at any rate, we 
have moved beyond these views of science, and extended philosophical 
concerns far beyond physics.  We can watch the construction of the winding 
streets and charming piazzas of the social sciences with philosophical 
equanimity. 
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